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The collapse of Britain's Barings
Bank in February 1995 is
perhaps the quintessential tale of
financial risk management gone wrong. The failure was
completely unexpected. Over a course of days, the bank went from apparent
strength to bankruptcy. Barings was Britain's oldest merchant
bank. It had financed the Napoleonic wars, the Louisiana purchase, and the
Erie Canal. Barings was the Queen's bank. What really grabbed the world's attention was the fact that
the failure was caused by the actions of a single trader based at a small
office in Singapore.
The trader was Nick Leeson. He had grown up in the
Watford suburb of London. After attending university, he worked briefly
for Morgan Stanley before joining Barings. At both firms, he worked in
operations, but shortly after joining Barings, he applied for and received
a transfer to the Far East. His first task when he arrived was working
through a back-office mess in Jakarta. The bank was sitting on
GBP 100MM
in stock certificates and
bearer bonds that were not in deliverable form.
Many of the stocks had been purchased on behalf of clients. Because the
stock market had subsequently declined, the clients trying to avoid taking
delivery—they complained that certificates were in the wrong denomination,
not properly document or in physically unacceptable condition. Over a
period of 10 months, Leeson worked his way through the certificates,
addressing the problems and making delivery.
Barings had maintained an office in Singapore since 1987.
Called Baring Securities (Singapore) Limited (BSS), it had originally focused on equities, but its volume of
futures trading on the SIMEX (today's Singapore Exchange) was growing. Without a seat on the
exchange, BSS was having to pay commissions for all its
transactions. The next step was to purchase a seat and hire
traders.
Leeson's accomplishments in Jakarta attracted the
attention of Barings management. When he applied for a position within BSS, they not only accepted him, but they made
him general manager with authority to hire traders and back office staff.
Leeson arrived at BSS in 1992 and started hiring
local staff. As general manager, Leeson's job was not trading, but he soon
took the necessary exam so that he could trade on SIMEX along with his
small team of traders. He was now general manager, head trader and, due to
his experience in operations, de facto head of the back office. Such an
arrangement should have rung alarm bells, but no one within
Barings' senior management seemed to notice the blatant conflicts of
interest. Leeson and his traders had authority to perform two types of
trading:
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transacting futures and
options orders for clients
or for other firms within the Barings organization, and
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arbitraging price differences between Nikkei futures traded
on the SIMEX and Japan's Osaka exchange.
Perhaps it was the inherent lack of
risk in such trading
that prompted people to not be concerned about Leeson wearing multiple
hats.
Leeson took unauthorized speculative positions primarily in futures
linked to the Nikkei 225 and Japanese government bonds (JGB) as well as
options on the Nikkei. He hid his trading in an
unused BSS error account, number 88888. Exactly
why Leeson was speculating is unclear. He claims that he originally used
the 88888 account to hide some embarrassing losses resulting
from mistakes made by his traders. However, Leeson started actively trading
in the 88888 account almost as soon as he arrived in Singapore. The sheer volume
of his trading suggests a simple desire to speculate. He lost money from
the beginning. Increasing his bets only made him lose more money. By the end of 1992, the 88888 account was under
water by about GBP 2MM. A
year later, this had mushroomed to GBP 23MM. By the end of 1994, Leeson's
88888 account had lost a total of GBP 208MM. Barings management remained
blithely unaware. On February 23, 1995, Nick Leeson hopped on a plane to
Kuala Lumpur leaving behind a GBP 827MM hole in the Barings balance sheet.
As a trader, Leeson had extremely bad luck. By mid
February 1995, he had accumulated an enormous position—half the open interest
in the Nikkei future and 85% of the open interest in the JGB future. The
market was aware of this and probably traded against him. Prior to 1995,
however, he just made consistently bad bets. The fact that he was so
unlucky shouldn't be too much of a surprise. If he hadn't been so
misfortunate, we probably wouldn't have ever heard of him.
Traders sometimes speculate without authorization.
Presumably, a few are able to cover their tracks. Others are caught. When
they are caught, they are fired, and their employer eats the loss.
Usually, neither the trader nor his employer has any interest in
publicizing the incident. Leeson made headlines precisely because he was
so unlucky. By the time he was discovered, he had bankrupted his employer.
Publicity was unavoidable.
What is amazing about Leeson's activities is the fact that
he was able to accumulate such staggering losses without Barings'
management noticing. As Leeson lost money, he had to pay those losses to
SIMEX in the form of margin. Leeson needed cash. By falsifying accounts
and making various misrepresentations, he was able to secure funding from
various companies within the Barings organization and from client
accounts. His misrepresentations were flimsy at best. For example, he
claimed that he needed funds to make margin payments on behalf of BSS
clients, and he gave a technical argument related to how the SIMEX
collected margin as justification. This claim was false. It was actually
against SIMEX rules for a broker to post its own money as margin for a
client. Even if the claim were true, the funds would have been needed only
temporarily—until the client could make payment. Instead, Leeson continued to
ask for ever more funding. Most of this came from three companies within
the Barings organization:
Baring Securities Limited (BSL)—securities arm of parent
Barings Plc.;
Baring Securities (London) Limited (BSLL)—BSL's London
office;
Baring Securities (Japan) Limited (BSJ)—BSL's Japan
office.
Exhibit 1 tracks the funding of BSS by these three
companies in the months leading up to Barings' collapse.
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Funding for Baring Securities (Singapore)
Limited (BSS) came primarily from three companies within the Barings
organization. This exhibit tracks their funding of BSS in the months
leading up to the failure of Barings. Essentially all the funding
was used by Leeson to make margin payments to SIMEX. Source: Bank of
England. |
Despite his having to fund millions of GBP in losses, there
were various factors that allowed Leeson to avoid discovery. At the time,
there was a merger going on between two parts of the Barings organization.
Barings had acquired stock brokerage Henderson Crosthwaite in 1984, which became BSL.
Originally, BSL was run as an entirely separate company from the banking
business, which was called Baring Brothers and Company (BB&Co.). This
is indicated in Exhibit 2.
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An abbreviated organizational structure
for Barings prior to the 1993 merging of BB&Co. and BSL. Entities
not relevant to this article have been omitted. For example, BSL
also had offices in New York and Hong Kong. |
In November 1993, BSL was merged into BB&Co. in
anticipation of a subsequent initiative to form a Barings Investment Bank
(BIB). The merger was not easy because the two firms had markedly
different cultures. It was a distraction right in the middle of Leeson's
tenure at BSL. The new organizational structure following the merger is
indicated in Exhibit 3.
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An abbreviated organization structure for
Barings following the 1993 merging of BB&Co. and BSL. In 1994,
BB&Co. and BSL became part of the new BIB. |
Barings was just starting to form a
risk management
function. Risk controllers were appointed in London, Tokyo and Hong Kong
during 1994, but not in Singapore. In BSS, Leeson effectively controlled
the front and back offices. There was no middle office. Also, there was no
single person within Brings responsible for supervising Leeson.
As part of the 1993 reorganization, Barings had adopted a
"matrix" approach to management of its offices. There was one reporting
structure based upon products that cut across all offices. Another was
based upon operations, ensuring local management of such items as systems,
controls, settlement and accounting. Employees complained that lines of
reporting were not always clear.
Leeson was involved with two "products"—futures
arbitrage
and trade execution for clients or other companies within the Barings
organization. During 1994, his "product" line of reporting could arguably
have been to either Ron Baker, who managed derivatives, or Mike Killian,
head of Global Futures and Options Sales. Locally, Leeson could have
reported to James Bax, who was head of the Singapore office, or to Simon
Jones, who was Regional Operations Manager for South East Asia.
Another issue was that Leeson was an accomplished liar. He
falsified records, fabricated letters and made up elaborate stories to
deflect questions from management, auditors and even representatives of
SIMEX. Leeson actively played on people's insecurities. He notes in his
(1996) book
Rogue Trader that:
People at the London end of Barings were all so know-all
that nobody dared ask a stupid question in case they looked silly in front
of everyone else.
Some people did raise concerns about Leeson's activities.
In a January 1995 internal e-mail, Brenda Granger, Head of Futures and
Options Settlements in London stated
Awaiting breakdown from my buddy Nick … (once they
creatively allocate the numbers).
Such concerns went largely unheeded. Leeson was somewhat
of a celebrity within Barings. While he was secretly accumulating losses
in account 88888, he was publicly recording profits in three arbitrage
trading accounts, numbers 92000, 98007 and 98008. This was accomplished
through cross-trades with account 88888. By performing futures
transactions at off-market prices, Leeson was able to achieve profits in
the arbitrage accounts while placing offsetting losses in the 88888
account. During 1994, Leeson booked GBP 28.5MM in false profits. This was
a staggering profit to earn from futures arbitrage, but it ensured that
Barings employees earned bonuses that year. Needless to say, there was
little incentive for employees to question the unusually high arbitrage
profits. If anything, Leeson was viewed as a star trader who was not to be
interfered with.
In a famous 1993 quote, Peter Baring, Chairman of Barings,
commented to Brian Quinn, Director of the Bank of England that
The recovery in profitability has been amazing following
the reorganization, leaving Barings to conclude that it was not actually
terribly difficult to make money in the securities markets.
Six days after fleeing Singapore, Leeson was arrested in
Frankfurt trying to make his way back to London. He was returned to
Singapore to stand trial. Convicted of fraud, he was sentenced to six and
a half years years in Singapore's Changi prison. While there, he
contracted cancer, which he survived, and was divorced by his wife. For
good behavior, he was released from prison early in July 1999.
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Enron debacle
In December 2001, energy trading powerhouse Enron filed for bankruptcy in the
midst of an accounting scandal.
financial
risk management Practices by which a firm optimizes the
manner in which it takes financial risk. |
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Ads by Contingency Analysis
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Bank of England (1995). Board of
Banking Supervision investigation into the failure of Barings,
London: Bank of England. |
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