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The Basel Committee
has played a
leading role in standardizing bank regulations across jurisdictions. Its
origins can be traced to 1974.
On June 26, 1974, German
regulators forced the troubled Bank Herstatt into liquidation. That day, a
number of banks had released payment of
DEM to Herstatt in Frankfurt
in exchange for USD that was to be delivered in New York. Because of
time-zone differences, Herstatt ceased operations between the times of the
respective payments. The counterparty banks did not receive their USD
payments.
Responding to the cross-jurisdictional implications of the Herstatt debacle, the G-10 countries (the G-10 is actually eleven
countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United
States) and Luxembourg formed a standing committee under the auspices of
the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS). Called the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, the committee comprises representatives from central banks
and regulatory authorities. Over time, the focus of the committee has
evolved, embracing initiatives designed to:
define roles of regulators in cross-jurisdictional
situations;
ensure that international banks or bank holding
companies do not escape comprehensive supervision by a “home” regulatory
authority;
promote uniform
capital requirements so banks from
different countries may compete with one another on a “level playing
field.”
The Basel Committee’s does not have legislative authority,
but participant countries are implicitly bound to implement its
recommendations. Usually, the committee has allowed for some flexibility
in how local authorities implement recommendations, so national laws vary.
In 1988, the Basel Committee proposed a set of minimal
capital requirements for banks. These became law in G-10 countries in
1992, with Japanese banks permitted an extended transition period. The
requirements have come to be known as the
1988 Basel Accord.
To understand the scope of the 1988 accord, we need to
clarify what we mean by "bank." Some jurisdictions distinguish between
banks and securities firms, and the Basel accord applied only to the
former.
Under its
Glass-Steagall
Act,
the United States had long distinguished between
commercial banks and
securities firms
(investment banks or
broker-dealers). Following World War II, Japan
adopted a similar legal distinction. The United Kingdom also distinguished
between banks and securities firms, although this was more a matter of
custom than law. By comparison,
Germany and other European countries had a tradition of
universal banking,
which made no distinction between banks and securities firms.
The 1988 Basel Accord
primarily addressed banking in the sense of deposit taking and lending
(commercial banking under
US law), so its focus was
credit risk. Banks were subject to an 8%
capital requirement. Specifically, they would calculate metrics for:
capital, and
credit risk.
with a requirement that:
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A bank's capital was defined as comprising two tiers.
Tier 1 ("core") capital included
the book value of
common stock,
non-cumulative perpetual
preferred stock and published
reserves from post-tax retained earnings. Tier 2
("supplementary") capital was deemed of lower quality. It included,
subject to various conditions, general loan loss reserves, long-term
subordinated debt and cumulative and/or redeemable preferred stock. A
maximum of 50% of a bank's capital could comprise tier 2 capital.
Credit risk was calculated as the sum of risk-weighted asset values.
Generally, G-10 government debt was weighted 0%, G-10 bank debt was
weighted 20%, and other debt, including corporate debt and the debt of
non-G-10 governments, was weighted 100%. Additional rules applied to
mortgages, local government debt in G-10 countries, and contingent obligations, such
as letters of credit or
derivatives.
In the early 1990s, the
Basel Committee decided to update the 1988 accord to include bank capital
requirements for
market risk. This would have implications for non-bank
securities firms.
Any capital requirements the Basel Committee adopted for banks’ market
risk would be incorporated into future updates of Europe’s
Capital Adequacy
Directive (CAD) and thereby apply to Britain’s non-bank securities
firms. If the same framework were extended to non-bank securities firms
outside Europe, then market risk capital requirements for banks and
securities firms could be
harmonized globally. In 1991, the Basel
Committee entered discussions with the
International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to jointly develop such a framework.
IOSCO is the primary international organization representing
securities
regulators. The
two organizations formed a technical committee, and work commenced in
January 1992.
Because of the fundamental differences between banks and
securities firms (see this glossary's article
regulatory capital), the initiative soon ran into trouble.
Europe's draft CAD regulations already applied uniform capital standards
to banks and securities firms. They had to because Europe's universal
banks were both banks and securities firms. Many European regulators
wanted the Basel-IOSCO initiative to adopt rules similar to the draft CAD.
This would have required that the
SEC abandon its own long-established
Uniform Net
Capital Rule (UNCR) for securities firms in favor of the weaker
European rules.
Richard Breeden was chairman of the SEC and chairman of
the Basel-IOSCO technical committee. Ultimately, he balked at discarding
the SEC’s rules. An analysis by the SEC indicated that the European
approach might reduce capital requirements for US securities firms by 70%
or more. Permitting such a reduction, simply to harmonize banking and
securities regulations, seemed imprudent. The Basel-IOSCO initiative had
failed. In the United States, banking and securities capital requirements
were to remain distinct.
In April 1993, following the failure of the Basel-IOSCO initiative, the
Basel Committee released a package of proposed amendments to the 1988
accord. Primarily, these proposed minimum capital requirements
for banks’ market risk. The proposal generally conformed to Europe’s CAD.
Banks would be required to identify a trading book and hold capital for
trading book market risks and organization-wide foreign exchange
exposures. Capital charges for the trading book would be based upon a
crude value-at-risk (VaR) measure loosely consistent with a 10-day 95%
VaR metric. Similar
to a "building block" VaR measure used by Europe's CAD, this partially recognized
hedging
effects but ignored diversification effects.
In addition to capital for credit risk, banks would now be required to
hold capital equal to the calculated VaR. If we define market risk as VaR / 8%,
the proposed amendment required that banks hold capital such that:
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The proposal also liberalized the definition of capital by adding a
third tier. Tier 3 capital comprised
short-term subordinated debt, but it could only be used to cover market risk.
The committee received numerous comments on this proposal. Commentators
perceived the crude VaR measure as a step backwards. Many banks were
already using proprietary VaR measures. Most of these modeled
diversification effects, and some recognized portfolio non-linearities.
Commentators wondered if, by embracing a crude VaR measure, regulators
might stifle innovation in
risk measurement technology.
In April 1995, the Basel Committee released a revised proposal. This made a
number of changes, including the extension of market risk capital
requirements to cover organization-wide commodities exposures. An
important provision allowed banks to use either a regulatory
building-block VaR measure or their own proprietary VaR measure for
computing capital requirements. Use of a proprietary measure required
approval of regulators. A bank would have to have an independent
risk
management function and satisfy regulators that it was following
acceptable risk management practices. Regulators would also need to be
satisfied that the proprietary VaR measure was sound. Proprietary measures
would need to support a 10-day 99% VaR metric and be able to address the
non-linear exposures of options. Diversification effects could be
recognized within broad asset categories—fixed income,
equity, foreign
exchange and commodities—but not across asset categories. Market risk
capital requirements were set equal to the greater of:
the previous day’s VaR, or
the average VaR over the previous sixty business days, multiplied by
a factor of at least 3.
The original VaR measure—which was now called the “standardized”
measure—was changed modestly from the 1993 proposal. It may reasonably be
interpreted as still reflecting a 10-day 95% VaR metric. Extra
capital
charges were added in an attempt to recognize non-linear exposures.
The Basel Committee’s new proposal was adopted in 1996 as an amendment
to the 1988 accord. It is known as the 1996 amendment. It went into effect
in 1998.
By this time, shortcomings with the original accord's treatment of
credit risk were becoming evident. The simple system of
risk weightings provided an incentive for banks to hold the 0%
risk-weighted debt of G-10 governments (a fact viewed with some cynicism,
since those same governments were largely responsible for the original
accord). However, such debt tended to be unprofitable. Far more profitable
for banks was corporate debt, which was weighted 100%. With all corporate
debt being weighted equally, it made sense for banks to hold the most
risky corporate debt. Higher quality corporate debt incurred exactly the
same capital charges but was less profitable.
During this period, markets for
credit
derivatives and securitizations grew explosively.
It was an open secret that banks were employing
these to take advantage of shortcomings in the 1988 Accord's crude system of risk weights.
This practice is called
regulatory arbitrage.
Another issue during this period was
operational risk. Operational risk poses significant risk for banks.
It includes a variety of contingencies including fraud—and fraud is
routinely a factor in bank failures. Neither the original Basel Accord nor
the 1996 Amendment required capital for operational risk.
In January 1999, the Basel Committee proposed a new capital accord,
which has come to be known as Basel II.
There followed an extensive consultative period, with the committee
releasing additional proposals for consultation in January 2001 and April
2003. It also conducting three quantitative impact studies to assess those
proposals. The finalized Basel II Accord was released in June 2004.
Basel II is based on three pillars:
minimum
capital requirements,
supervisory
review, and
market
discipline.
Generally, Basel II retains the definition of bank capital and the market
risk provisions of the 1996 Amendment. It largely replaces the old
treatment of credit risk, and it requires capital for operational risk.
With some juggling, the basic capital requirement for banks can be
expressed as:
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As with market risk under the 1996 Amendment, banks have options as to
how they value their credit risk and market risk. For credit risk, they
can choose from among:
a
Standardized Approach,
a Foundation
Internal Rating-Based (IRB) Approach, and
an Advanced
IRB Approach.
For operational risk, their choices are:
a Basic
Indicator Approach
a
Standardized Approach, and
an Internal
Measurement Approach.
Basel II has an effective date of December 2006. It will not be as
widely implemented as the earlier Accord. Basel II largely achieves
European regulators' objectives of addressing shortcomings in the original
accord's treatment of credit risk, incorporating operational risk and
harmonizing capital requirements for banks and securities firms. Europe will apply
Basel II to all its banks with
CAD III. US regulators are
less enthusiastic. While they share the goal of addressing shortcomings in
the original accord's treatment of credit risk, they feel that existing
bank supervision in the United States already addresses operational risk.
Also, harmonization has never been a priority for US regulators. They perceive
Basel II as primarily relevant for internationally
active banks. They intend to apply it to just ten of the largest US banks.
Another ten will have the option to opt-in. Other US banks will remain
subject to existing US regulations, including those adopted under the
original Basel Accord. It remains unclear to what extent other countries
will implement Basel II.
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