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During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Enron was a trading
powerhouse. The firm, which had started as a US natural gas pipeline
company, started trading energies, then launched into new markets,
including metals, paper, water, weather and bandwidth. For a time, it
seamed that everything Enron touched turned to gold. The firm attracted
some of the best talent, first from the energy industry, and then from Wall
Street. In 2001, the Enron empire collapsed. The
firm's bankruptcy was the largest in US history, surpassed seven months
later by WorldCom's bankruptcy.
Kenneth Lay ("Kenny Boy" to friend George W. Bush) was Enron's
Chairman and CEO. He formed the company by merging Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth in 1985. The company adopted the name Enron in 1986. Both of
the merged companies were primarily pipeline companies. In 1986, the new
Enron owned a 37,000 mile pipeline system stretching across North America.
It also had a mountain of debt.
Richard Kinder had worked under Lay at Houston Natural Gas
and became President of Enron. A tough, prudent businessman who kept a
tight handle on expenses, Kinder was the perfect person to oversee the
cash-generating pipeline system and gradually pay down the firm's debt.
Ken Lay was different. A hands-off manager and a business
visionary, he saw opportunity in the rapid deregulation of energy markets
in the United States and around the world. He attracted subordinates who
wanted to seize these opportunities. Of these, the two most influential
were Rebecca Mark and
Jeff Skilling.
Mark was a strikingly beautiful and charming woman. Her
business wardrobe included fur coats and stiletto high heals. Aggressive and accustomed to getting her way, her nicknames came to
include "Mark the Shark" and "Hell in High Heals." Like Lay and Kinder,
Mark had come to Enron from Houston Natural Gas. At Enron during the late
1980s, she worked in the electric power division, learning how to
negotiate international power generation projects in a market that was
just beginning to attract investors. One important deal was a gas-fired
electricity generating project at Teesside in Northern England. Lay was impressed with
Mark's style and
facilitated her advancement in the firm. After taking two years off to
earn a Harvard MBA, Mark convinced Lay to let her form an international
division that would pursue more energy projects around the world. Enron
Development Corporation was formed in 1991 with Mark as CEO. In 1993, this
would become Enron International.
Jeff Skilling is known as a cold-hearted businessman whom
Enron employees called "Darth Vader" behind closed doors. He earned a
Harvard MBA in 1979. He became a consultant for McKinsey where he advised
Enron on how to manage its gas pipeline in the rapidly deregulating US
natural gas market. He came up with the idea of forming a "gas bank" that,
much as a financial bank does with
capital, would intermediate between
short-term and long-term buyers and sellers of natural gas. The gas bank
would be named Enron Gas Services, and later, Enron Capital and Trade
Resources (ECT). Its formation was a crucial development that established
Enron as an innovator in the energy industry. To ensure adequate supplies
of natural gas for his bank, Skilling suggested that Enron get in the
business of providing financing to third party oil and gas producers. In
August 1990, Enron Finance Corp was formed and Skilling was hired away
from McKinsey to be its CEO.
In the early 1990s, Rebecca Mark and Jeff Skilling were
the rising stars of Enron. A fierce rivalry developed between them. Mark
was globetrotting around the world, acquiring or building power plants and
related projects. Skilling was modeling ECT as an investment bank of sorts
for the energy industries. Their competing visions came to be known as
"asset heavy" and "asset light." Mark promoted the acquisition of physical
assets. Skilling promoted the use of Enron's balance sheet for
intermediating deals.
For years, Mark seemed to be successful. She and her team
of deal makers fashioned themselves as missionaries of privatization. They
were closing deals, but the actual profitability of those deals would not
be known for years. Employees—and especially Mark—stood to earn enormous
bonuses just for closing deals. Many of those deals would later come back
to haunt Enron.
By far, Mark's biggest deal was a two-stage power project
that she built in Dabhol India. The first stage burned oil. The second,
larger stage burned liquefied natural gas (LNG). LNG is an expensive fuel,
so output from the plant would be four times as expensive as other
electricity available in India. India had widespread poverty. Much of the
electricity produced in India was stolen. The government never cracked
down on theft for fear of a popular backlash. The World Bank refused to
support the Dabhol project, claiming that it made no economic sense. There
was widespread popular opposition to the project, so Mark had her
political work cut out for her. When Indian protestors were forcefully
dispersed from the building site, Enron was accused of human rights
abuses. With fits and starts, the project moved forward, only to collapse
in 1996, when India's Congress Party was voted out of office.
Mark worked tirelessly to restart the project, flying back
and forth between Houston and India. Lay recruited the involvement of the
Clinton administration, which actively pressured the new Indian Government
to restart the project. After some renegotiation, the project was
relaunched. Enron's deal with the Indian government required the
state-owned electric utility to buy power from the Dabhol plant whether it
was needed or not. By some estimates, the utility would have to make
payments totaling USD 30 billion over the life of the project.
For Mark, the project was a stunning success, generating
fame and enormous bonuses. In 1998, she made the cover of Forbes
magazine. She was appointed to the Board of Overseers of Harvard Business
School and the Advisory Board of Yale's School of Management. Enron proxy
statements indicate that her combines compensation for 1996 to 1998 was
USD 25.7MM
While Mark was launching the Dabhol project, Skilling was
back in the United States pursuing his "asset lite" strategy. Following on
the heals of his success of the gas bank, he launched ECT into natural gas
trading, creating an active market where none had existed. Deregulation in
the United States opened the door for electricity trading, and ECT jumped
in. By the mid 1990s, it had 200 power marketers working out of two
trading floors in Houston. In 1995, Enron hopped the Atlantic to open a
London office to trade power and natural gas. The firm would soon become a
dominant force in European energy markets. Skilling started exploring new
markets in which to apply the "Enron model." These would come to include:
weather, paper pulp, plastics, and metals.
Skilling also set his sights on retail electricity markets
in the United States. These were deregulating more slowly than the
wholesale markets, but the vision was for residences to some day choose an
electricity provider in the same way they chose a phone provider. This
vision never panned out, but, for a time, Enron devoted considerable
resources to building brand awareness. Television ads ran in several
markets displaying the Enron company logo and promoting Enron's innovative
spirit.
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Enron's company logo. It prompted
employees to refer to the firm as the "Crooked E." |
Skilling's vision was to trade energies and other
commodities the way Wall
Street trades capital. In 1991, he convinced Enron's Audit Committee to
allow him to apply mark-to-market accounting to ECT's trading books.
For liquid trading
activities, mark-to-market accounting is appropriate and far superior to
accrual accounting. It is widely used in the
capital markets. In Enron's case, it wasn't always appropriate. Many of
the markets ECT was trading in were not liquid. Enron was launching
those markets. ECT was entering into long-dated gas and power deals for which no
liquid markets existed. In this context, mark-to-market accounting became
mark-to-model accounting. Traders who were performing trades had
considerable influence in how the deals were marked to model. With their
bonuses depending upon the profitability of deals, there was an
unaddressed conflict of interest. Skilling's trading businesses were
generating considerable profits, but much of these were dubious
mark-to-model profits on long-dated deals.
Skilling was also working to outmaneuver Mark. He arranged
things so that ECT would provide financing to other divisions of Enron,
including Mark's Enron International. If Skilling tried to block Mark's
financing, Mark could always go directly to Lay or raise financing outside
Enron. Still, Skilling's strategy enabled him to slow Enron International
and give him a context to criticize Mark's heavy spending on projects.
In 1996, Skilling won a significant victory over Mark. That year, Kinder had
a falling out with Lay over a situation involving Lay's assistant, Nancy
McNeil. Kinder
and McNeil left Enron and were married soon after. Lay tapped Skilling to replace Kinder as President and COO. Now Skilling was in line to eventually replace Lay as CEO.
Mark remained a significant force within Enron, but Skilling was
consolidating his position, promoting a circle of cronies into senior
positions. In Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling, Enron now had two business
visionaries at its helm, but there was no one to replace Richard Kinder's
prudence.
Enron still had considerable debt, and its credit rating
was barely investment grade. Lay, Skilling and Mark were all spendthrifts.
Mark had already established a reputation as a big spender, jet setting
around the globe, spending lavishly on Enron International corporate
offices and sparing no expense to entertain clients and counterparties.
With Kinder gone, Lay immediately sold off the firms fleet of modest
corporate jets and purchased a more expensive fleet, including a USD
41.6MM Gulfstream V for his personal use. Worst of all was Skilling,
who was not about to let creditors get in the way of his business vision.
He went on a hiring spree. Between 1996 and 1997, Enron's staffing
doubled, going from 7,456 employees to 15,555.
Skilling established a harsh corporate culture that pitted
employees against each other, constantly weeding out non-performers or the
politically isolated and replacing them with new hires. Central to his
scheme was the performance review committee (PRC), also known as "rank and
yank." Skilling had long employed PRC in ECT, but now he implemented it
company-wide. Every six months, every employee's performance was reviewed
by a committee of managers. Employees were rated on a scale of 1 to 5,
with 5 being the worst. It was required that 15% of the entire workforce
be rated a 5 in each PRC. These employees were "redeployed." They were
moved to a separate area of the company, given a desk, phone and computer
and granted several weeks to find another job within Enron. After that,
they were let go.
Managers on the PRC frequently wouldn't know the employees
they were reviewing, so other employees would submit written feedback.
Each employee could ask five associates to submit letters commenting on
his performance, but anyone else could submit unsolicited comments as
well. The process was extremely political. Employees could undermine each
other by submitting negative comments. Employees would enter into deals
with one another to submit good reviews. Managers would horse trade. If
one wanted to eliminate more than 15% of his staff and another wanted to
keep most of hers, they might collude. Managers used the PRC to reward
friends, and all employees were under pressure to enlist a senior manager
as a protector.
The PRC undermined
risk management within Enron. Complex
deals and mark-to-model valuations had to be approved by risk management.
Risk managers knew that they would suffer in the PRC if they blocked deals
or did not support favorable mark-to-model valuations. Risk management
became little more than a rubber stamp and a stepping stone for employees
moving around the company.
Andrew Fastow was a 1986 MBA from Northwestern University.
He worked at Continental Bank doing asset
securitization deals before
joining Enron in 1990. There, he worked on Enron's initiative to enter
retail electricity markets. He befriended Skilling, and was appointed
Enron's CFO in 1996 at the age of 37.
In 1993, Enron had formed a limited partnership with the
California Public Employees' Retirement System (Calpers), an enormous and
highly influential pension fund. Called the Joint Energy Development
Investment Limited Partnership (JEDI), the partnership invested in natural
gas projects. Participation of Calpers meant that JEDI was an independent
entity from Enron. Enron earned profits from the partnership, but none of
JEDI's debt appeared on Enron's balance sheet.
In 1997, Enron wanted to launch a new and larger limited
partnership called JEDI II, but it thought that Calpers would be loath to
invest while it was still invested in JEDI. Enron couldn't simply buy out
Calpers investment in JEDI, which was worth USD 383MM. This would make Enron the sole investor in
JEDI. JEDI would no longer be independent, and its debt would
have to appear on Enron's balance sheet. Fastow proposed forming a new
venture, called Chewco Investments, to take Calpers place as an investor
in JEDI.
Enron's culture was heavily influenced by the movie
Star Wars. Employees referred to the corporate headquarters as the
"Death Star." The name JEDI was no coincidence. The new partnership's name
was a reference to the Star Wars character Chewbacca.
By replacing Calpers as an independent investor, Chewco
would allow Enron to keep JEDI's debt off its balance sheet. This would
only work if Chewco were also independent from Enron. Rather than find
a truly independent investor for Chewco, Fastow decided that one of his
subordinates, Michael Kopper, would play the role of independent investor
in Chewco. This was absurd. Kopper didn't have the personal resources to
make such an investment. Fastow's solution was an elaborate scheme
involving multiple special purpose entities and a direct investment by
JEDI of USD 132MM in Chewco—JEDI was investing in Chewco so that Chewco
could invest in JEDI. Except for USD 125,000 put up directly by Kopper and
his domestic partner, William Dodson, all of Chewco's funding originated
either from Enron or as loans
guaranteed by Enron. Enron's board approved
the Chewco deal without knowing the details of Kopper's role or specifics
of how the deal was financed. Enron treated Chewco as an independent
entity for accounting purposes, but it wasn't.
In 1998, Rebecca Mark was looking to shape a new role for
herself, preferably as far removed from Skilling as possible. Enron had
been toying with the idea of developing a water trading market, and she
perceived this as her opportunity. In 1998, she purchased Wessex Water,
one of England's most profitable water utilities. She paid USD 2.2
billion, a 30% premium over the utilities market capitalization. Her new
water venture was called Azurix. To keep its debt off Enron's books, a
number of outside investors were found to form an SPE, Marlin Water Trust,
to take a 50% stake. Mark started acquiring more assets. The biggest,
after Wessex Water, was a 30 year concession to provide water and sewage
services to 2 million residents of Argentina's Buenos Aires province. The
concession was awarded in a bidding process in which Mark paid USD 439MM,
three times the second highest bid.
Mark was determined to take Azurix public. This would give
her an independent company far removed from Jeff Skilling. In June 1999,
she floated a third of the company at USD 19 per
share, raising USD 695MM.
Azurix was doomed from the start. Water is a localized
business that lacks the continent-spanning pipelines and transmission
systems that allow natural gas, oil and power to be moved and traded
between locations. Water could never be traded the same way. The regulated
water business has extremely low margins. Utilities made money by cutting
expenses to the bone, but Mark was oblivious to this hard reality. She ran
Azurix as if money was never an issue. She overpaid for acquisitions and
spent lavishly on office space, salaries and travel. At the same time, her
acquisitions were turning sour. In Argentina, Azurix discovered that its
new acquisition did not include the home office, staff or billing system
of the existing utility. Thousands of billing records were mysteriously
missing, which meant people would be receiving water, but Azurix would
have no idea who they were or where to send bills. In November 1999, UK
regulators ordered a 12% cut in the prices Wessex could charge customers.
That same month, Azurix cut its staff by a third, incurring a one-time hit
to earnings of USD 30MM. In August 2000, Mark resigned as
Chairman and CEO of Azurix and left Enron for good. She sold her Enron
stock, netting an estimated USD 82MM. Enron would later buy back outstanding Azurix
stock at USD 7 per share. The Argentina investment would be written off. In
2002, Wessex Water would be sold to a Malaysian company for a fraction of
the price Enron had paid.
One of Enron's most visible successes was EnronOnline, an
Internet-based trading platform launched in 1999. This was the brainchild
of Louise Kitchen, head of gas trading in Europe. The system allowed
clients to log on, check bid and ask prices and perform trades directly
with Enron while online. Initially, transactions could be booked in only
certain energies, but soon the offerings were expanded to include metals,
plastics, paper pulp, weather, etc. Volumes grew rapidly to several
thousand transactions a day. EnronOnline had the effect of squeezing
bid-ask spreads, but lost revenues were made up by increased volumes. EnronOnline had an Achilles heal. Because all transactions were
with Enron, every customer who traded on the system was taking
credit
exposure to Enron. If Enron's credit rating were to falter, trading
volumes could dry up.
By the late 1990s, Enron had established a reputation for
itself as a preeminent global enterprise. Most of Rebecca Mark's
staggering losses on international power and water projects had not yet
been realized. In energy markets, Enron was the 600 pound gorilla that
shaped markets to its will. It was the envy of competitors. Wall Street
knew there were problems, but they were also dazzled by Enron's successes
in trading new markets and launching EnronOnline. The world economy was in
the midst of a technology-driven bubble. The Internet was going to change
all the rules. Capital was cheap, and stock prices were soaring. Office
workers who had never given much thought to investing started trading
stocks on-line and tracking market gossip in Yahoo chat rooms. Wall Street
firms raked in profits taking firms like pets.com or furniture.com public.
There has long been a conflict of interest for investment
banks whose equity analysis must rate a firm's stock for investors at the
same time its investment bankers are wooing that firm as a client. In the
overcharged market environment of the late 1990s, an implicit quid pro quo
of "buy" recommendations in exchange for investment banking business
became increasingly blatant. Enron played the game skillfully. The firm
was constantly doing deals: buying, selling and merging firms or
orchestrating SPEs. Skilling and Fastow were careful to spread the
business around, so every firm on Wall Street rated Enron's stock a "buy."
In 1998, Enron invested USD 10MM in an Internet startup
firm called Rhythms NetConnections that was about to go public. The day of
the IPO, Rhythms shares soared from USD 21 to USD 69. By May 1999, Enron's
investment was worth USD 300MM. Because of a six month lockout provision,
Enron was barred from immediately realizing this gain. Enron was also
sitting on a large unrealized gain on a
forward
contract it had purchased
from Union Bank of Switzerland on its own stock. Enron could not take the
gain as income because accounting rules prohibit firms from including in
income gains made on their own stock.
To protect these gains and recognize them as income,
Andrew Fastow proposed a new SPE called LJM after the initials of his wife
and two sons. LJM would be a private equity fund with Fastow as general
partner. The structure was extremely complicated, involving a USD 1MM
investment by Fastow and USD 15MM from outside investors. Four SPEs were
formed specifically for the deal. The net effect was to transfer the
forward on Enron stock to LJM, which would use this asset to hedge a
put
option on Rhythms stock, which LJM would issue to Enron. From a financial
standpoint, the deal had little merit. If both the price of Rhythms stock
and Enron stock were to fall, LJM would be under water (ultimately, this
is what happened). The accounting was dubious for many reasons. It
disguised rather than eliminated the problem of Enron booking income
resulting from rises in its own stock price. Assets were transferred
between Enron and LJM at below market values. With Fastow as general
partner, LJM was not independent from Enron—its balance sheet should have
been consolidated with Enron's, but it was not. More importantly, allowing Fastow to be general partner of LJM posed serious conflicts of interest.
In negotiating deals between the two entities, Fastow—as general partner
of LJM and CFO of Enron—would sit on both sides of the table.
The deal caused significant dissention both within Enron
and its accounting firm, Arthur Andersen. One internal Andersen e-mail
reads: "Setting aside the accounting, idea of a venture entity managed by
CFO is terrible from a business point of view ... Conflicts of interest
galore. Why would any director in his or her right mind ever approve such
a scheme?" Still, with Skilling and Fastow aggressively behind LJM, the
deal moved forward. Andersen was earning tens of millions of dollars a
year from Enron and was determined to keep its client happy. It signed off
on the deal so long as Enron's board approved of Fastow being general
partner. At a June 28, 1999, board meeting, Ken Lay presented LJM. The
board set aside its own ethics rules prohibiting company officers from
doing deals with the firm and approved LJM.
Fastow started doing deals between LJM, Enron and Chewco.
He was effectively representing all three in "negotiating" the deals,
so assets could be transferred at any prices he chose. If an asset changed
hands at an inflated price, it would be marked-to-market at that new
price, and the selling party would recognize income. Enron realized millions of
dollars in market value gains from LJM. At the same time, LJM was earning
high returns for its investors, including general partner Fastow himself.
Larger and increasingly dubious SPEs followed, including
LJM 2 and Raptors I, II, III, and IV. Fastow ran them; Andersen signed off
on them; and, for the most part, Enron's board approved them. Outside
investors were found among Wall Street firms, who were too afraid of
losing Enron's investment banking business to refuse to invest. Investors
also included several Enron employees. Some of the ventures were financed
primarily with Enron stock, which means they would be in trouble should
the stock price fall. Fastow busily pulled the strings, flipping deals
back and forth between Enron and the various SPEs. The net effect was to
allow Enron to disguise debt, park assets that were losing money, and
assign inflated mark-to-market valuations to other assets. The SPEs also
generated extraordinary returns for investors. Over the lives of the
various SPEs, Fastow is estimated to have personally pocketed USD 45MM as
an investor. This was in addition to millions of dollars Enron paid him in
salary and bonuses.
In February 2001, Lay passed the title of CEO to Skilling.
Skilling was now President and CEO. Lay remained Chairman. Skilling's
tenure as CEO was to be short-lived.
Enron had aggressively been amassing a fiber optic cable
network in the United States. Internet usage was growing. As applications,
such as video-on-demand or teleconferencing became more popular, it was
predicted that demand for bandwidth would increase dramatically. In many
respects, bandwidth was like natural gas or electricity. Instead of
flowing through pipes or wires, it flowed through fiber optic cables.
Enron's vision was to apply its trading model for energies to create a
global market for trading bandwidth.
The vision was never to be. There were technical
challenges in the way. More importantly, many other firms had been
building fiber optic networks. The market was seriously overbuilt. With an
overabundance of supply, Enron's own network became almost worthless, and
prospects for trading bandwidth evaporated. The technology bubble was
over, and stocks were entering a bear market.
On July 13, 2001, Skilling resigned as CEO. He claimed it
was for family reasons. The real reason was that Enron was heading for
trouble, and he didn't want to stick around for it. The firm's stock was
down about 40% for the year. If it kept falling, several of Fastow's SPEs—those
primarily financed with Enron stock—would be under water. India had stopped making payments for electricity
generated by the Dabhol plant. Enron had shuttered the plant in May and,
despite the Bush administration pressuring India on Enron's behalf, was
facing the prospect of writing off its entire USD 900MM
investment. The company had recently spent USD 326MM to buy back the
shares of the failed Azurix water company. Sever shortages of electricity
in California had lead to rolling blackouts and accusations that Enron had
been manipulating prices. The venture in bandwidth trading had failed
spectacularly, and ventures in metals and pulp trading were racking up
losses. The company was in a cash crunch, and was trying to sell assets to
raise cash. Skilling could see the writing on the wall, but so could most
of Enron's senior management. Many had been liquidating their holdings in
Enron stock for months. Skilling not only resigned as president and CEO, he also gave up
his seat on Enron's board.
The resignation shocked Wall Street. In the days following
the announcement, Enron's stock dropped from USD 42.93 to USD 36.85. It
was also a wakeup call for Enron employees, who knew something was amiss.
On August 15, 2001, Lay received an anonymous memo from an employ that
opened: "Has Enron become a risky place to work? For those of us who
didn't get rich over the last few years, can we afford to stay?" The memo
detailed the perilous shape of Enron's finances, focusing special
attention on Fastow's SPE and associated accounting irregularities. It
concluded: " ... I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of
accounting scandals." The author of the memo was Sherron Watkins, a former
Andersen employee who had joined Enron in 1993. She currently worked in
accounting, reporting to Fastow. Watkins soon came forward and had a
meeting with Lay to discuss her concerns. She outlined essential steps
that Lay should take to turn the situation round, but she may have been
too late. There was no longer an easy way out of Enron's problems. Rather
than follow Watkin's advice, Lay had lawyers look into whether it would be
advisable to fire her. They advised against it, and she was transferred to
another department.
Rumors were swirling about Enron. Equity analysts, who had
previously assigned the company's stock a "buy" rating without question,
started to complain that the firm's financial disclosures were opaque.
They didn't withdraw their "buy" recommendations, but there was pressure
on Enron to make more complete disclosures.
On October 16, Enron reported third quarter earnings that
included a one-time charge of USD 1.01 billion. Much of the hit was due to
writing down bad investments, including Azurix and the bandwidth venture.
USD 35MM of it was due to losses on transactions with LJM. LJM wasn't
named in the press release, which simply referred to "early termination
during the third quarter of certain structured finance arrangements with a
previously disclosed entity." Analysts were stunned, but there was more to
come. That same day, in a conference call to analysts, Lay mentioned that
the firm was reducing shareholders' equity by USD 1.2 billion arising from
the repurchase of 55 million shares of Enron stock from SPEs.
In the following days, the Wall Street Journal
published a series of bombshell articles. One on October 17 detailed how Fastow and
other investors had pocketed millions of dollars from LJM. Enron's stock
price slid to USD 32.20. An October 18
article traced the USD 1.2 billion hit to shareholder equity to Enron's
unwinding of the Raptor SPEs. These had been financed with Enron stock,
and the plummeting stock price had made them insolvent. That day, Enron's
stock dropped to USD 29.00. The next day brought an article detailing how Fastow had made millions from his LJM 2
investment. Enron stock closed at USD 26.05.
By the end of October, Enron was under investigation by
the SEC, a dozen class action law suits were filed on behalf of Enron
shareholders, Fastow left the company, and the stock closed at USD 13.90.
Worst of all, counterparties were refusing to trade with Enron. Trading
was Enron's primary source of revenue, and now it was drying up. Ken Lay
was feeling out officials within the Bush administration to see if a
bailout might be possible, but no help was forthcoming. At Arthur
Andersen, employees were shredding documents.
On November 8, Enron filed restated financial results with
the SEC. These acknowledged that Chewco, and hence JEDI, were not truly
independent entities. Consolidating their financials with Enron's for the
period 1997 to 2000 resulted in a USD 586MM reduction in Enron's
earnings for the period. It increased Enron's debt by USD 2.6 billion.
Enron was in serious risk of having its credit rating
downgraded to below investment grade by Moody's or S&P. All that was
preventing a downgrade was a glimmer of hope that Enron might be able to
arrange a merger with its competitor Dynergy. Merger negotiations dragged
on for several weeks, as bad news continued to pile up. Enron's financial
situation was deteriorating rapidly, making a merger seem increasingly
less likely. On November 28, Moody's and S&P downgraded Enron's debt to
below investment grade. Dynergy backed out of merger negotiations,
claiming Enron had misrepresented its situation. On the New York Stock
Exchange, 182 million shares of Enron stock changed hands, setting a
record for one-day volume in a single stock. The share price closed for
the day at USD 0.61. On December 2, Enron filed for bankruptcy.
Many people suffered from Enron's failure, but employees
were hit especially hard. Thousands were laid off with just USD 4,500 in
severance pay. Enron had encouraged employees to invest their pension
assets in the company's stock. Employees who had done so lost
pension savings as well as their jobs.
In June 2002, Arthur Andersen was convicted for obstruction
of justice related to its destruction of Enron documents. Andersen, which was
once the largest accounting firm in the United States, was barred from
auditing clients.
Federal prosecutors conducted a
multi-year investigation of Enron, seeking indictments of a number of key
personnel. Fastow agreed to plead guilty and cooperate with prosecutors in
exchange for a ten year prison sentence. Lay and Skilling maintained their
innocence, claiming that Enron was a healthy firm done in by irresponsible
reporters, short sellers and panicky
investors. After a lengthy trial, both men were convicted on May 26, 2006
of multiple counts of fraud and conspiracy. Six weeks later, awaiting
sentencing and possible appeals of his convictions, Kenneth Lay died
suddenly of a heart attack.
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Barings debacle In
February 1995, Britain's Barings bank was bankrupted by a single trader making
unauthorized trades out of a Singapore office.
corporate risk
management Practices that serve to optimize risk taking in a context of
book value accounting.
financial
risk management Practices by which a firm optimizes the
manner in which it takes financial risk.
off-balance
sheet financing Financing that doesn't appear on a firm's
balance sheet.
valuation
Article about book value, market value and mark-to-model
accounting. |
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Bryce (2002)
and McLean and Elkind (2003)
describe the rise and fall of Enron. Smith and Emshwiller (2003)
is the first-hand account of the Wall Street Journal
writers who broke the Enron story.
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24 Days |
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Rebecca Smith and John R. Emshwiller |
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quality |
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technical |
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2003 |
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