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Hedge funds are popularly perceived as small, secretive
investment funds run by financial gurus who earn extraordinary
returns managing money for the super rich.
Another perception is provided by Forbes Magazine, which describes
hedge funds as "the sleaziest show on Earth ... a business rife with
exorbitant fees, phony numbers and outright thievery." What is undeniable
is the fact that hedge funds have proliferated since 1996, and investors
are pouring money into them. This article explores what hedge funds are
and why they have become popular.
There is no precise definition of what is or is not a
hedge fund. The term generally refers to a limited partnership or
corporation that manages investments and is structured in a manner that
largely exempts it from financial regulation. Hedge funds generally take
leveraged positions in publicly traded
equity, debt, foreign exchange and
derivatives. For
this reason, venture capital funds, private equity funds, commodity pools
and real estate partnerships are not generally considered hedge funds.
Hedge fund's charge investment fees that typically include a management fee, which is calculated as a fixed
percentage of assets under management, and an incentive fee, which is
calculated as a percentage of the fund's returns. Other "administrative"
fees may also be charged. A fund might charge a 2% management fee and a
0.4% administrative fee in addition to a 20% incentive fee. If this fund
managed USD 100MM and earned USD 18MM in income and capital gains over a
year, the combined fee for the year would be:
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(0.024) (USD 100MM) + .20 (USD 18MM) = USD 6.0MM |
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For ease of exposition, this example assumes fees are paid
annually. In practice, they are charged monthly or quarterly.
The incentive fee may be subject to a
hurdle rate or
high-water mark provision. With the former, the performance fee is paid on
only returns in excess of some hurdle rate. If there were a 5% hurdle rate
in the above example, the total fee would be reduced to
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0.024 (USD 100MM) + .20 (USD 18MM – USD 5MM) = USD 5.0MM |
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A hurdle rate may also be set equal to some variable
index, such as Libor. About one in
five hedge funds employ a hurdle rate of some sort.
With a high water mark, a hedge fund must recover any
losses—return to the last high-water mark—before incentive fees can be
charged. For example, if a hedge fund loses USD 10MM one year but earns
USD 12MM the next year, any performance fee for the second year will be
based on only the USD 2MM gain in excess of the prior year's loss.
Since investors may join the fund at different times, high water marks
must be tracked individually for each investor. About four out of
five hedge funds employ a high-water mark provision.
The origins of even the word "hedge fund" are obscure.
Hedge funds play more the role of speculators than of
hedgers. The
name may have arisen to reflect the fact that many hedge funds focus on
market neutral trading
strategies. By putting on
long-short positions, they seek
to hedge themselves against broad market moves while profiting from
changes in the relative value of the instruments they go long or short.
This was largely the strategy pursued by
Alfred W. Jones, who was a pioneering
hedge fund manager. He launched his fund,
A.W. Jones & Co., in 1949 and ran it continuously
through the early 1970s. He put on leveraged
long and
short positions in
equities. While he didn't follow a strict market neutral strategy, his
main source of returns was relative bets made between individual equities.
Jones is purported to have achieved excellent returns with his strategy.
Today, hedge funds pursue a variety of investment or
trading strategies. These go by various names, and there is some overlap
between strategies. Generally, they fall into three categories:
Directional strategies
involve taking positions that will benefit from broad market rises or
declines.
Market neutral strategies involve taking
offsetting long and short
positions within a specific market. The goal is to avoid net exposure to the
overall market while benefiting from changes in the relative value of
individual instruments within that market.
Event
driven strategies seek to exploit temporary mispricings associated
with some corporate event, such as a merger or divestiture.
Many of the strategies employed by hedge funds entail
(directly or indirectly) providing
liquidity to markets and earning a liquidity spread when they do so.
In effect, the hedge fund provides a service to the market, and this
allows them to make money fairly consistently. Of course, simply earning
liquidity spreads won't make anyone wealthy. To make attractive returns,
hedge funds leverage themselves. For example, over any year, a USD 100MM
hedge fund might earn USD 1MM deploying its
capital to provide
liquidity to markets. If
liquidity risk were the only risk
it took, the fund would also earn the risk free return on its capital.
Suppose for this example that the risk free rate is 3%. Then the hedge
fund would earn in total USD 4MM a year—a 4% annual return. To boost this,
the hedge fund might leverage itself. If it borrowed USD 900MM, it would
have USD 1,000MM to deploy and would earn USD 10MM providing liquidity to
markets. Add this to the same USD 3MM it would still earn investing its
capital at the risk free rate, and the fund would earn USD 13MM a year. On
USD 100MM capital, that is a respectable annual return of 13%. After fees,
investors might earn 9%.
This, in a nutshell, is how many hedge funds make their
returns. They earn liquidity spreads and leverage themselves to make the
returns attractive. For an experienced trader, this is all quite mundane.
It also entails considerable risk. When you provide liquidity to markets,
you are in essence accepting positions that will be difficult to unwind in
an emergency. You are agreeing to be the party left "holding the bag" when
things fall apart. That is why markets compensate liquidity providers in
the first place! Seen in this light, the returns these hedge funds
earn are not leveraged profits so much as leveraged insurance premiums.
The hedge funds are like unregulated insurance companies writing insurance
policies to other market participants and pocketing the insurance
premiums. When markets crash, they tend to lose money. Because they are
highly leveraged, they can lose enormous sums of money. It is not atypical
for hedge funds to lose most, if not all their capital. This is what happened to the
hedge fund Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM) back in 1998. Other spectacular hedge fund
failures can be attributed to excessive leverage, including:
David
Askin's Granite Fund lost all its
USD 600MM capital in February 1994 when the
Federal
Reserve raised interest rates and the fund's leveraged
CMO
positions plummeted.
John
Koonmen's Japan-based Eifuku Master
Fund was heavily leveraged with just a few concentrated positions
when it lost essentially all its USD 300MM capital over a one week period
in 2002.
Nicholas
Maounis' massive Amaranth
Advisors fund folded after losing USD 6.5 billion—70% of its
capital—betting on natural gas prices in
2006.
Fraud is another problem with hedge funds. Because they
avoid most financial regulation, there is little oversight of hedge fund
activities. Some don't release audited financial statements. Their
positions are often illiquid and difficult to
mark to market. Combine this with
the generally secretive nature of hedge funds—the so called transparency
issue—and there is little to stop a fund manager from misleading his
investor, should he choose to do so.
This is what happened with
Michael Berger's Manhattan Fund,
which shorted technology stocks between 1996 and 2000 when those stocks
were soaring. Berger and his investors perceived that a bubble was
forming, but their timing was off. The fund lost money consistently.
Berger falsified brokerage statements, so the fund's audited financial
statements reported annual returns of between 12% and 27%. Based on those
claims, the fund continued to attract new investments, and Berger used
them to pay his mounting margin calls.
In August 1999, Berger reported to investors that the fund had net capital
of USD 426MM when in fact it had only USD 28MM. In January 2000, Berger
failed to meet his margin calls, and the fund collapsed. Investors lost
about USD 400MM. Following his arrest, Berger skipped bail and was placed
on the FBI's most wanted list.
Fraud has played a role in the collapse of many other hedge
funds, including
David
M. Mobley, Sr., manager of the Maricopa
funds, invested fund assets in his own businesses, most of which
failed. He also tapped fund assets to make donations to charities and to
pay for a luxurious lifestyle for himself and his family. Between 1993 and
2000, he reported annual returns of about 50% after his 30% fee. In 2000,
he claimed the funds had assets of USD 450MM when they really had only USD
33MM. Authorities intervened shortly thereafter.
Lipper & Co's
Lipper Convertible Fund lost
heavily in convertible arbitrage
trading between 1996 and 2002. The fund's manager,
Edward Strafaci, falsified returns during
much of that period. He claimed a 7.7% return for 2001 when the fund
actually lost 40%.
John
D. Barry and the other managers of
Beacon Hill Asset Management
lied about losses in their
market
neutral hedge funds during 2002. SEC filings claim they also defrauded
hedge fund investors by transacting trades at off-market prices between
the hedge funds and other accounts they managed. Between August and
October 2002, the hedge funds lost 54% of their value.
Michael
Lauer's Lancer Offshore Fund
invested in distressed small cap stocks. It was successful for a while but
suffered heavy losses during the bear market of 2000-2003. Lauer reported
gains to investors while the fund's capital plunged USD 571MM.
Today, hedge funds are increasingly being promoted to
institutional investors, who insist on better disclosures. In this
context, the mystique of hedge funds as exclusive firms secretively
earning spectacular returns can no longer be maintained. Instead, hedge
funds are promoted as exclusive firms secretively earning returns that
offer
an attractive risk-reward tradeoff, and
are
largely uncorrelated with returns on traditional stock or
bond portfolios,
making them an excellent means for
diversifying
institutional portfolios.
Reported hedge fund returns would seem to justify thee claims. Exhibit 1 presents average returns and volatilities for several
categories of hedge funds. The same data is graphed in Exhibit 2.
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Average annual returns and
volatilities for selected
CSFB/Tremont hedge fund indexes and the S&P 500 over the eleven year
period from 1994 through 2004. Index returns are after fees.
Volatilities were calculated from monthly returns and then
annualized.
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Graph of results from Exhibit 1. |
The analysis is based on eleven years of return data for
hedge fund indexes maintained by CSFB/Tremont. It seems to indicate that
all hedge fund categories offer superior risk-return characteristics over
the S&P 500. The sole exception is
dedicated short bias hedge funds. While the above analysis was
performed specifically for this article, it is typical of analyses that
are widely distributed in books and hedge fund marketing literature. It is
because of such analyses that many investors believe hedge funds offer
attractive risk-reward characteristics and can reduce risk by diversifying
other investments.
On the surface, these results may appear too good to be
true. During much of the 20th century, but especially since the 1960s, an
extensive scholarly literature has supported the notion that public debt and
equity markets are efficient—that any trading strategy based on publicly
available information can be expected to sometimes outperform or
underperform the overall markets, but none can be expected to consistently
outperform over the long term. The literature includes both empirical and
theoretical studies, some of which were published by Nobel Prize winners.
The theory isn't perfect. Scholars have searched for and discovered minor
imperfections. However, the results presented in Exhibits 1 and 2
represent more than a minor imperfection in efficient markets theory. If
valid, they represent an imperfection the size of Texas.
Actually, the analysis of Exhibits 1 and 2 is based on biased data,
and the same can be said of all similar analyses. While there are
different providers of historical data on hedge fund performance, all
their indexes are constructed in a manner that introduces biases.
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Alternative Asset Center
Blue Chip Hedge Fund Index
CSFB/Tremont (HEDG)
Dow Jones
Edhec Alternative Indexes
Eurekahedge Indexes
Evaluation Associates
Feri Alternative Assets
FTSE Hedge
HedgeFund.Net
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Hedge Fund
Intelligence
Hedge Fund
News
Hedge Fund
Research (HFR)
Hennessee
Group
Managed
Account Reports (MAR)
MondoHedge
MSCI Hedge
Fund Indexes
Standard &
Poor's
TalentHedge
Van Hedge
Fund Indexes
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A list of
organizations that maintain hedge fund indexes. |
Most providers have some vested interest in the success of
the hedge fund industry, and that vested interest may color the decisions
they make about how to construct their indexes. Also, hedge funds aren't
required to contribute their performance data to anyone. They will have a
natural inclination to contribute their data to those providers that they
perceive as most friendly to the hedge fund industry. Here are some biases
that affect some or all hedge fund indexes.:
backfill
bias: When a hedge fund is added to an index, the fund's past performance
may be "backfilled" into the index. For example, if the fund has been in
business for two years at the time it is added to the index, past index
values are adjusted for those two years to reflect the fund's performance
during that period. Not all indexes backfill, but those that do introduce
a bias. Usually, a hedge fund will start contributing data to an index to
draw attention to recent strong performance. One of the oldest tricks in
investment management is to launch multiple investment funds and then
market those that happen to perform well. The
practice is also common among hedge funds, who report the winners to
indexes while closing down the losers. Also, index providers generally have criteria for adding a new
fund to an existing index. This may include a minimum assets under
management requirement, and successful funds are more likely to satisfy
this criteria than unsuccessful ones. In summary, successful funds are
more likely to be added to an index than unsuccessful ones, so this biases
indexes that backfill. While backfilling is obviously a questionable
practice, it is also quite understandable. When a provider first launches
an index, they have an understandable desire to go back and construct the
index for the preceding few years. If you look at
time series
of hedge fund index performance data, you will often note that indexes
have very strong performance in the first few years, and this may be due
to backfilling.
survivorship
bias: When a fund is dropped from an index, past values of the index may
be adjusted to remove that dropped fund's past data. Inevitably, a fund
will be dropped from an index if it stops providing its performance data
to the index provider, and a fund will be more likely to do so following
poor performance than good. Also, providers may have criteria for dropping
a fund, and this may naturally cause poor performers to be dropped more
often than good performers.
liquidation
bias: Due to their considerable leverage, hedge funds can fail suddenly.
In the midst of such a calamity, the managers are going to have more
important things on their minds than reporting their mounting losses to
index providers. An index provider will have little choice but to drop the
fund from the index. They may go back and purge the index of that fund's
past performance or they may not. Either way, the index will not reflect
the fund's staggering losses.
fraud bias: One
hedge fund that misrepresents its performance can severely bias an index.
Suppose an index is based on 25 hedge funds. One is fraudulent and
misrepresents a 30% loss as a 20% gain. That one misrepresentation will
bias the index return by about 2%.
mark-to-market
bias: Many hedge funds hold illiquid positions that are difficult to
value. Inevitably, there is some subjectivity in how they choose to mark
those positions to market. Natural human optimism—as well as incentive
fees and egos on the line—will create a natural tendency for managers to
over-value rather than under value those positions.
All these factors tend to bias returns upward. There is
also a problem with the volatilities
of hedge fund indexes, which can have little resemblance to the
volatilities of the funds that comprise those indexes. Several of the
above biases may contribute to the problem. Liquidation bias obviously
does, and
fraud bias and mark-to-market bias may also do so. The bigger problem is
diversification. Because indexes include multiple hedge funds, their volatilities are substantially lower than what would be
experienced with a single hedge fund. In theory, because they entail no
systematic risk,
the volatility of market neutral hedge funds can be completely diversified
away. Take another look at
Exhibits 1 and 2. The hedge fund strategies that have the extraordinarily
low volatilities are equity market neutral,
convertible arbitrage,
merger
arbitrage, and fixed income arbitrage.
All are generally implemented as market neutral strategies. For this
reason, the volatility of those indexes reflects more the degree to which
the indexes are diversified than they do the volatilities of the
individual hedge funds that comprise the indexes.
As a practical matter, institutional investors do diversify across
multiple hedge funds, but this can be expensive because the incentive fees
on those hedge funds don't diversify. As a simple example, suppose an
institution invests in two hedge funds, both of which have a 20% incentive
fee. Suppose one fund earns USD 10MM while the other loses USD 10MM. The
investor has realized a 0% return, but they still have to pay a USD 2MM
incentive fee to the successful hedge fund.
This is a serious problem with
funds of funds. These are hedge funds
that invest exclusively in other hedge funds. They are marketed to
investors as an easy way to diversify across multiple hedge funds. Not
only do funds of funds pose the incentive fee non-diversification problem
mentioned above, but they layer their own fees on top of the fees charged
by the hedge funds they invest in. Typically, a fund of funds might charge
a 1.5% management fee along with its own 5% or 10% incentive fee. This is
on top of the perhaps 2% management fee and 20% incentive fee charged by
the typical hedge fund in its portfolio.
Financial regulators tend to view the concept of funds of
funds as abusive due to layering of fees. In the mutual fund industry,
funds of funds are illegal. This is not an issue for funds of hedge funds,
since they are largely unregulated. Now, so-called
F-3 hedge funds are being formed. These
are funds of funds of funds.
Why did hedge funds suddenly become popular after being a
fringe industry for so many decades? The
National Securities
Markets Improvement Act, which Congress passed in 1996, may be the
primary
reason. Up until its passage, hedge funds had received exemption from
regulation under Section 3(c)(1) of the 1940
Investment
Company Act. To protect the investing public, that section placed
severe restrictions on the nature and number of investors a hedge fund
might have. The Improvement Act added a new Section 3(c)(7). This
liberalized those restrictions, dramatically increasing opportunities for
hedge funds to attract investors. Large brokerage firms have helped hedge
funds exploit this opportunity.
Hedge funds are frenetic traders who generate brokerage
commissions out of proportion to their assets under management. While a
typical institutional investor generates trading commissions that total
less than 1% of their assets under management, for a hedge fund, that
number can easily exceed 3%. Customers like these get red carpet treatment.
Brokerage firms don't just execute and clear trades for them. They offer
bundled services called prime brokerage. Typically, a hedge fund selects a firm to be
its prime broker, and that firm provides
services, including
support in
launching the hedge fund,
marketing,
office space,
and
running funds
of funds that invest in the hedge fund.
Prime brokers make it surprisingly easy to launch and run
a hedge fund. The marketing they provide is critical. Due to their
regulatory status, hedge funds are not allowed to publicly advertise. In
the past, this seriously hampered a hedge fund's ability to raise capital.
Prime brokers solve the problem by providing hedge funds with
introductions to their clients. A typical large broker has an enormous
client base that includes institutional investors and high net worth
individuals. Introductions comprise more than a name and a phone number.
Prime brokers are known for hosting lavish "introduction parties" at
exclusive resorts.
By 2005, hedge funds accumulated a trillion dollars in
total capital. That translates into perhaps 30 billion dollars a year in
brokerage commissions. This is a huge sum of money for prime brokers. The
1996 Improvement Act opened the door, but it is marketing muscle from
those prime brokers that is fueling the hedge fund industry's explosive
growth.
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arbitrage
A transaction which generates a risk-free profit.
directional strategy
A trading or investment strategy that entails taking net long or short
positions in a market.
event driven strategy
Speculative trading strategy that seeks to exploit relative mispricings between
securities whose issuers are involved in mergers, divestures, restructurings or
other corporate events.
leverage Debt financing or anything that can similarly magnify the risk
and reward of an investment.
liquidity
Term used in various senses, all relating to availability of, access to, or
convertibility into cash.
liquidity risk Risk due to uncertain liquidity.
managed futures
Portfolios of forwards or futures managed as an "alternative asset category."
market neutral
strategy Speculative trading strategy that seeks to exploit relative mispricings
between instruments while avoiding systematic risk.
market risk Exposure to the uncertain market value of a portfolio.
soft
dollars A sometimes controversial inducement brokers offer
investment managers to place trades through them.
United States financial regulation An overview. |
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There are lots of hedge fund books
available. A fun and highly enthusiastic introduction is Ineichen
(2002).
Balance his sales pitch for hedge funds with a more conservative
book like Lhabitant (2002).
Another excellent book, which offers more the hedge fund manager's
perspective, is McCrary (2002).
For more experienced readers, Schacter (2004)
offers excellent information. Lowenstein (2000)
is the definitive narrative on the collapse of Long Term Capital
Management. It is a classic.
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The
Sleaziest Show On Earth, Forbes, May
24, 2004. |
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Ads by Contingency Analysis
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