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Soft dollars are
a—sometimes controversial—inducement brokers offer investment managers to
place trades through them. A broker sets aside a portion of the
commissions it receives from an investment manager. The investment manager
is allowed to spend these "soft dollars" on third-party research,
financial data or other services that can aide its investment decision
making.
Brokers have long provided investment advice, research or
other services to clients—including investment managers—as an inducement
for them to trade with those brokers. The extra services cost money, so
brokers who provide them tend to charge higher commissions. Soft dollar
arrangements are a natural extension of this. Soft dollars allow the
broker to "outsource" the extra services it offers an investment manager.
Rather than limiting an investment manager to using the broker's own
research, soft dollars allow the broker to offer the investment manager
research or other services from any third party the investment manager
chooses.
A problem with soft dollars is the fact that the
investment manager selects the broker and directly benefits from the soft
dollars while it is the investment manager's clients who pay the
commissions that fund the soft dollars. Investment managers have an
incentive to trade with expensive brokers who offer soft dollars while
their clients might prefer they trade with less expensive brokers who
don't offer soft dollars.
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Soft dollars can pose a conflict because
the investment manager selects the broker and directly benefits from
the soft dollars while it is the investment manager's client who
pays the commissions that fund the soft dollars. |
It is argued that clients of an investment manager benefit
indirectly from soft dollars because the research or other services soft
dollars buy enhance a manager's ability to make sound investment
decisions. A counterargument is that clients would be better served if
there were no soft dollars and investment managers simply increased their
fees to cover the cost of directly purchasing the research or other
services the soft dollars buy. This would provide greater transparency and
eliminate opportunities for abuse.
Abuses have long been associated with soft dollar
arrangements, which have occasionally been used to purchase goods or services unrelated
to improving investment decisions—things like office administration,
carpeting, office rents, membership dues, travel and even entertainment.
Critics see soft dollar arrangements as little more than kick-backs to
investment managers.
Efforts to regulate soft dollars tend to focus on limiting
their use to purchases of services directly relevant to investment
decision making—things like research and financial data.
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